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Abstract
Detention and deportation of migrants is a clear perfor-
mance of state sovereignty that relies on discretionary prac-
tices and policies. The ongoing conflict in Syria highlights 
the strain and social disruption in neighbouring countries 
that host the majority of the world’s Syrian refugees. This 
article looks at Jordan’s policies to detain and deport Syrian 
refugees. Documented reasons for detention and deporta-
tions include work permit infractions, including the depor-
tation of Syrian doctors and medical practitioners, as well 
as deportations for communicable diseases. Detention 
and deportation policies in Jordan are highly discretion-
ary, making interventions and advocacy on behalf of those 
detained difficult. Detention and deportation can also have 
disproportionate impact on populations that are already 
marginalized, including members of the LGBTI community, 
survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, and those 
engaged in sex work.
Résumé
La détention et la déportation des migrants constituent de 
manière évidente une conduite de souveraineté étatique 
basée sur des politiques et des pratiques discrétionnaires. Le 
conflit actuel en Syrie éclaire les tensions et les perturba-
tions sociales dans les pays voisins, qui hébergent la majo-
rité des réfugiés syriens du monde. Cet article examine les 
politiques jordaniennes de détention et de déportation des 
réfugiés syriens. Les motifs documentés de détention et de 
déportations comportent les infractions de permis de tra-
vail, y compris la déportation de médecins et de praticiens 
médicaux syriens, ainsi que les déportations motivées par 
des maladies transmissibles. En Jordanie, les politiques de 
détention et de déportation sont très discrétionnaires, ce qui 
rend difficiles les interventions et la défense des droits des 
personnes détenues. La détention et la déportation peuvent 
également toucher de manière exagérée des populations 
déjà marginalisées, y compris les membres des communau-
tés LGBTA, les survivants à des violences sexuelles et sexistes, 
et les personnes pratiquant le travail du sexe.
Introduction*
The notion that Syrian refugees are detained and deported back into zones of active conflict is shock-ing. However, such detentions have been documented 
in the neighbouring countries of Turkey, Lebanon, and Jor-
dan, which host the majority of the world’s Syrian refugee 
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populations. The threat of detention and deportation is 
profoundly damaging for an already traumatized refugee 
population. These policies also disrupt social cohesion in 
the host country and exacerbate protection issues for mar-
ginalized communities, especially when the detention and 
deportation of Syrians is linked to health-care concerns and 
human rights abuses. 
The broader use of detention as a mechanism to inter-
dict and control refugee populations has been widely noted, 
particularly in so-called transit countries that serve as an 
intermediary to a final destination.2 However, countries 
like Jordan do not neatly fit this transit-country label. Jor-
dan already had a large Syrian population before the start 
of the conflict, and it will likely continue to host significant 
numbers for the foreseeable future. As a result of Jordan’s 
explicitly exclusionary policies, Syrian refugees remain 
impermanently permanent3—not fully Jordanian but also 
not simply transiting. As a result, they continue to be vulner-
able to discretionary policies of detention and deportation at 
the hands of Jordanian authorities. 
In times of crisis,4 a nation under threat strengthens and 
polices its borders by enacting increasingly hardline policies 
of control over migrants.5 In particular, detention and depor-
tation of migrants highlight this performance of sovereignty, 
as these practices sharply differentiate between those who 
can and cannot remain. For example, scholars of detention 
practices such as Mainwaring and Silverman have described 
state practices of detention as a spectacle,6 a practice that is 
at once both visible and obscure).7 Detention practices as a 
particular enforcement spectacle of interdiction and migra-
tion control have also been discussed.8 In particular, it is 
the discretionary nature of detention that allows the state to 
benefit from being able to enact unfair policies with few safe-
guards, under the guise of having to protect its security in 
times of crisis. Discretion in detention practices also exacer-
bates issues of access to justice for detainees and perpetuates 
ongoing human rights abuses.9 By stripping them of their 
rights, these discretionary practices also render detainees as 
undesirable, detainable, and ultimately, deportable.10
While Jordan should be commended for handling a large 
number of Syrian refugees over the last six years with relative 
stability, Jordanian detention policies are an ineffective way 
to control the numbers of Syrian refugees and instead per-
petuate a discretionary system that is in direct contravention 
of international law. Jordan exercises its broad discretion to 
detain and deport Syrian refugees for a host of reasons that 
the state sees fit. These can include vague “security threats,” 
work permit infractions, including by Syrian doctors and 
medical personal who are gravely needed in the strained 
Jordanian health-care system, as well as detention and 
deportations of people living with communicable diseases, 
such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. The intersection between 
health concerns and detention is particularly troubling. Jor-
dan’s robust health-care system, once a leader in the region, 
has been under ongoing strain since the start of the Syrian 
conflict and the need to expand services to the war-affected 
Syrian population. 
This strain on the health-care system is coupled with 
Jordan’s broader problematic policy to deport any foreigner, 
refugee or not, who is found to be HIV positive.11 Jordan’s 
need to police its borders and prevent the incursion of a 
manufactured threat of a communicable disease results in a 
punitive system that stigmatizes people living with commu-
nicable diseases. These policies also deter people who may 
be living with communicable diseases from coming forward 
and seeking treatment for fear of detention and deportation, 
resulting in exceptionally low reporting rates and a lack of 
awareness of the impacts of the spread of infection among 
refugee and host population. 
Methodology
This article is based on fieldwork conducted by the author on 
behalf of the International Human Rights Program (IHRP) 
based at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. In May 
and June 2015, the IHRP conducted 45 interviews with 51 
individuals in Turkey (Istanbul, Gaziantep, and Antakya) 
and Jordan (Amman and Irbid), including lawyers, doctors, 
frontline practitioners working with NGOs and INGOs, and 
Syrian refugees. The primary purpose of this research was 
to ascertain Canada’s refugee policies and their impacts on 
Syrian refugees and host populations living with HIV, and 
resulted in an internal report written for the Canadian gov-
ernment.12 However, troubling patterns of detention and 
deportation policies in Jordan also emerged, forming the 
basis of this article. A further piece on broader practices 
of attrition through enforcement in Jordan’s and Turkey’s 
detention policies is forthcoming.13
All interviews adhered to strict confidentiality principles 
and were conducted using an open-ended questionnaire. 
Most interviews were conducted in private offices of NGOs 
and INGOs, while some were more informal. Many inter-
views with service-providers and NGO and INGO workers 
were followed up with by email or Skype. The interviewees 
were fully informed about the nature and purpose of our 
report and the manner in which their information would be 
used. They were also explicitly provided the option of not 
participating or remaining anonymous in the final report. 
All of the interviewees agreed to share their experiences 
and participate in the research; some chose anonymity and 
others changed or deleted their names for security reasons 
during the course of the interview or in subsequent com-
munications with the authors. None of the interviewees 
Volume 33 Refuge Number 2
20
received incentives in exchange for their participation. The 
interviews were conducted in-person with the exception of 
approximately 10 interviews, which were conducted either by 
phone or email, including correspondence with an organiza-
tion in Beirut, Lebanon. Additional contacts were gathered 
using the snowball sampling method based on established 
contacts in the region though journalistic, legal, and not-for-
profit networks. 
Part 1 of this article will provide a brief overview of the 
ongoing Syrian conflict and Jordan’s responses to the large 
numbers of Syrian refugees it continues to host. Part 2 will 
highlight the documented cases of detention and deporta-
tions and how detention intersects with the discrimination 
of already marginalized groups, exacerbating their isolation 
and fear of deportation. Part 3 will discuss recommendations 
for reform, including targeted domestic interventions to 
ongoing detentions and deportations, as well as international 
pressure to end Jordan’s problematic detention and deporta-
tion policies, which are in contravention of the principle of 
non-refoulement and international law.
Part 1: Syrian Conflict and Jordan’s Responses
The former UN high commissioner for refugees António 
Guterres has characterized Syrian refugees as “the biggest 
refugee population from a single conflict in a generation. 
It is a population that needs the support of the world but 
is instead living in dire conditions and sinking deeper into 
poverty.”14 As of August 2016, the United High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated the number of Syrian 
refugees at 4.8 million.15 In addition, there are at least 7.6 mil-
lion internally displaced people (IDPs) within Syria.16 Exact 
numbers of fatalities are difficult to verify in the ongoing 
conflict. However, according to the Syrian Centre for Policy 
Research, a non-governmental independent think tank, by 
2016 war fatalities would amount to over 470,000, and the 
number of injured and killed since the start of the conflict 
in 2011 was approximately 11.5 per cent of the population.17 
Syrian civilians are targeted in urban centres by the Assad 
regime18 and by armed militants including members of the 
Islamic State, also known as ISIS.19 As a result of ongoing 
violence, huge numbers of Syrians have fled to neighbouring 
countries such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, estimated to 
hold as high as 95 per cent of the total number of refugees.20 
This has created a precarious situation for the refugees as 
well as host country communities as the conflict continues.
Under international law, there is an obligation on all sig-
natories to the 1951 Refugee Convention to provide interna-
tional protection, including physical relocation of refugees. 
When protection cannot be guaranteed in the country where 
refugees first sought asylum, resettlement to a third country 
becomes an option. The UNHCR is mandated by its statute and 
by the UN General Assembly Resolutions to oversee resettle-
ment as one of the three “durable solutions” to refugee crises 
around the world.21 Resettlement is a small but vital piece 
of the international refugee response. However, the UNHCR 
estimates that only approximately 3 per cent of the overall 
Syrian refugee population has been offered viable resettle-
ment.22 Therefore, neighbouring countries continue to deal 
with large numbers of arriving Syrian refugees.23 This cre-
ates a strain on resources and social services and exacerbates 
the tension between host populations and Syrian refugees. It 
also unfortunately exacerbates problematic policies of inter-
diction, detention, and deportation of Syrian refugees. 
This article focuses on the responses in Jordan and its 
policies of detaining and deporting Syrian refugees for work 
infraction, including those of Syrian medical professionals, as 
well as potential deportations of Syrian refugees with commu-
nicable diseases. As noted above, the designation of Jordan as 
a transit country must be problematized. While some Syrian 
refugees do continue to third countries after arriving in Jor-
dan, and some are resettled, the majority of Syrians in Jordan 
are likely to remain there indefinitely. As such, they become 
enmeshed in the Jordanian formal and informal economies, 
and access Jordan’s social and health-care services. They are 
also a major source of international humanitarian and devel-
opment funding for Jordan. With the Syrian conflict showing 
no signs of abating, it is unlikely that the majority of Syrian 
refugees will be leaving Jordan. However, the Syrian refugee 
population continues to occupy a precarious space in Jordan, 
as seen by their detention and deportability. 
Jordanian Responses to the Syrian Conflict
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shares its northern bor-
der with Syria. Since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, 
Jordan has received approximately 1.257 million registered 
and unregistered refugees.24 The UNHCR coordinates the 
overall refugee response in collaboration with the Govern-
ment of Jordan. Jordan has two main refugee camps housing 
Syrian refugees: the Zaatari refugee camp complex and the 
Azraq refugee camp, both under the mandate of the Syrian 
Refugee Affairs Department (SRAD) of Jordan and managed 
by the UNHCR. There is also a privately operated Emirati 
Jordanian Camp, access to which is difficult to obtain and 
operates its own set of admission standards outside the man-
date of the UNHCR.25 Tent cities have also appeared around 
Ramtha, Cyber City, and King Abdullah Park, near the bor-
der with Syria’s southern Dara’a Province, and there is a large 
urban refugee population in cities such as Irbid, Mafraq, and 
Amman. According to a UNHCR report, 84 per cent of Syr-
ian refugees in Jordan were living outside refugee camps in 
2014.26 Unfortunately, the exact numbers of Syrians living 
outside Jordanian refugee camps are difficult to verify. Many 
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Syrians were already living and working in Jordan before the 
start of the conflict, and families have blended for genera-
tions. Syrians are also involved in both formal and informal 
economies in Jordan without registering with the UN or with 
the Jordanian authorities. 
While informal border points remain open along the 
Jordan-Syria border, according to Human Rights Watch, as 
of April 2015, all crossings had been officially sealed.27 This 
created a precarious security situation where thousands of 
Syrian refugees were trapped in border areas as they tried to 
enter Jordan. For example, Human Rights Watch obtained 
satellite imagery of approximately 175 tent structures in June 
2015.28 By June 2016, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (IRCC) estimated that “around 60,000 people [were] 
currently without food, water or healthcare.”29 These border 
regions operate outside the reach of the Jordanian authorities 
and are very dangerous. They are cut off from humanitarian 
assistance, and as a result of a suicide bombing attributed to 
ISIS on 21 June 2016, Jordan completely sealed its borders.30
Jordan’s Refugee Policies
The principle of non-refoulement is the “cornerstone of asy-
lum and of international refugee law.”31 Under the Refugee 
Convention, the principle of non-refoulement prohibits a 
state from removing refugees to their country where their 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of their 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.32 Article 33 (1) of the 1951 Con-
vention relating to the Status of Refugees states, “No Con-
tracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where 
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.”33 This principle ensures that all 
persons can fully enjoy their human rights, including right 
to life, liberty, and security of the person, and freedom 
from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of 
punishment. Returning a refugee to persecution or danger 
threatens these rights.
However, Jordan has not signed or ratified the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 
Protocol. Nevertheless, Article 21 of the Jordanian Consti-
tution prohibits the extradition of political refugees,34 and 
according to the UNHCR, the Jordanian government consid-
ers Syrians to be refugees.35 Jordanian law also lacks clear 
domestic refugee legislation or policy to protect refugees.36 
For example, Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreign-
ers’ Affairs requires those entering the country as political 
asylum seekers to present themselves and register at a police 
station within three days of arrival.37 Article 31 grants the 
administrative body of the Ministry of the Interior the power 
to determine whether persons who entered illegally will be 
detained and deported, on a case-by-case basis.38 Moreover, 
the law does not identify explicit conditions under which 
individuals will be eligible for asylum.39
Jordan is a signatory to the 1984 UN Convention against 
Torture40 and is bound by Article 3 not to return or expel 
any persons to states where they would be in danger of being 
tortured.41 Jordan also issued its only domestic refugee-
specific directive in 1998 in the form of a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) with UNHCR.42 This MOU gives UNHCR 
the right to determine the refugee status of asylum-seekers 
in Jordan. Article 1 of the MOU removes any geographic and 
time limitations for asylum-seekers, and Article 2(1) respects 
the concept of non-refoulement.43 According to the UNHCR, 
in the absence of any international or national legal refugee 
instruments in force in Jordan, the MOU “establishes the 
parameters for cooperation between UNHCR and the Gov-
ernment.”44 This cooperation includes UNHCR interventions 
in the detention of refugees, as will be discussed below.
Part 2: Deportations from Jordan
Jordanian policies of detention and deportation have long 
been discretionary and have raised numerous critiques about 
procedural justice safeguards. Groups such as Human Rights 
Watch have criticized Jordan’s broad administrative deten-
tion regime and point out that “governors and other officials 
routinely circumvent the criminal justice system when they 
detain people by administrative order and without judicial 
review.”45 The Global Detention Project’s 2015 report on Jor-
dan’s immigration detention practices details how Jordan’s 
ad hoc system of laws governing migration, refugee status, 
and detention results in a highly discretionary system with 
few procedural safeguards for detained migrants. While 
the 1973 Law on Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs and the 
Crime Prevention Law and the Act No. 9 of 2004 on Pris-
ons and Reinsertion Centres provides very basic procedural 
guarantees for all detainees, there is a “lack of uniformity or 
transparency in the decision-making process [which] leaves 
many immigrants vulnerable to human rights violations and 
arbitrary detention.”46 Charting the history and statistics of 
Jordan’s immigration detention practices is difficult, as the 
Jordanian government does not make these statistics avail-
able.47 However, multiple cases of torture, deprivation of 
rights, and death have been noted, including the death of a 
Syrian refugee in the Zaatari Refugee Camp.48
Forcible detainment and deportations to Syria were docu-
mented in a number of interviewees in May and June 2015. 
While there were no any official reports by the Jordanian 
authorities of these deportations, and exact numbers were dif-
ficult to verify, the UNHCR has publicly acknowledged that they 
are aware of deportations of Syrian refugees from Jordan.49
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However, there were local reports on the deportation 
of Syrians from Jordan. For example, Hazm al-Mazouni, a 
Syrian journalist with the Ammannet news agency based in 
Amman, Jordan, was the principal investigator on a report 
released in June 2015 that documented 58 deportations since 
2014.50 During his interview on June 2015, Mr. al-Mazouni 
estimated that there were also 11 cases of children under 18 
years deported from Zaatari camp with their families back 
to Syria. In Mr. al-Mazuni’s experience, deportations occur 
relatively quickly, often less than 24 hours after the person is 
apprehended. Out of the 19 cases found by Mr. al-Mazouni 
and his colleague, 16 were also deported on Fridays and 
Saturdays, which are considered holidays in Jordan. Mr. al-
Mazouni thought this was to curtail access to legal represen-
tation and the UNHCR. According to Mr. al-Mazouni, out of 
the 19 cases investigated, one person died in Syria in a bom-
bardment, while five people were in detention, with at least 
some inside an al-Nusra prison. Four people were volun-
teers with local organizations and were deported alongside 
wounded Syrian refugees, allegedly for not being allowed to 
work in Jordan.51 
In 2015, the UNHCR was aware of these deportations and, 
given its close relationship with the Jordanian government, 
it serves as the primary advocacy mechanism for the release 
of those detained.52 The UNHCR’s deportation unit liaises 
with the governorate that has administrative oversight over 
enforcing deportations and intervenes on individual cases. 
The UNHCR also has a 24-hour hotline and liaison officers 
who attempt to find out where the person is detained and 
intervene as soon as possible to secure the person’s release. 
The UNHCR also has some access to the administrative deten-
tion facilities where people are held in order to halt any 
deportations. The UNHCR is also aware of children in deten-
tion and works to secure their release.53 
Deportations for Work Permit Infractions
During the course of fieldwork in 2015, interviewees noted 
that one main reason for deportation of a Syrian refugee was 
work permit infractions. This included documented cases 
of practising Syrian physicians and medical personnel. 54 
However, as a result of pressure following an international 
conference (also known as the Jordan Compact) in London 
in February 2016, Jordan publicly committed to provide a 
target of 50,000 work permits for Syrians by the end of the 
2016.55 As a reward for this pledge, the European Union rati-
fied a new tariff-free export agreement with Jordan and busi-
ness would benefit when they pledged that Syrian refugees 
would comprise 25 per cent of their workforce after three 
years.56
This public push for work permits in Jordan has gar-
nered mixed results at best.57 For example, information 
dissemination about implementation of this policy varies 
greatly, both for agencies supporting refugees as well as 
refugees themselves.58 Also, there are also issues with the 
formalization of work and the fear felt by refugees of los-
ing benefits such as food vouchers or supports from inter-
national organization when they receive a work permit.59 
There is also no explicit mention of work permits for medical 
practitioners or specialists who could benefit from such as 
regime. Therefore, while the following data were gathered 
before changes were made to the work permit regime in Jor-
dan, the findings remain relevant to highlight the many chal-
lenges for Syrians wishing to work in Jordan and potentially 
facing detention or deportation as a result of being unable to 
access legal work. 
A number of interviewees noted the difficulty faced by 
medical practitioners when trying to work legally in Jordan. 
For example, the Justice Centre for Legal Aid (JCLA) is a legal 
aid organization in Amman, Jordan, that regularly repre-
sents Syrian refugees living and working in Jordan. In the 
JCLA’s experience, only a few people with “rare PhDs from 
Syria” were given work permits in Jordan before the Jor-
dan Compact in 2016. For the rest of the Syrian population 
they must resort to working without a permit, and if they 
are caught by Jordanian authorities, they may be sent to a 
refugee camp or deported back to Syria. This happened to 
Yaser,60 a middle-aged Syrian lawyer who sat in on the meet-
ing with the JCLA staff and was volunteering at the organi-
zations. He came with his family to Jordan from Syria but 
was caught working without a work permit, detained, and 
ultimately sent to Azraq refugee camp. After a few weeks, 
he managed to escape from the camp, walked through the 
desert to catch a transport truck to Amman, and rejoined 
his family in Amman. He is now especially careful about his 
work and status as a Syrian urban refugee living in Jordan. 
Yaser now spends his time volunteering at the JCLA, lending 
his legal expertise from Syria, but continues to be unable to 
work without proper authorization. 
The JCLA has documented other cases of refugees being 
deported and has represented Syrian clients facing deporta-
tion from Jordan. According to an assistant at the clinic, the 
idea is that if “you are a refugee, you shouldn’t work, and 
UNHCR should be paying for your food. You should not be 
influencing the Jordanian economy.” However, the inability 
to work and earn a sustainable income creates a host of prob-
lems, including access to health care and services. For exam-
ple, while Yaser’s family is covered for comprehensive health 
care by virtue of being present in Jordan before the start of 
the conflict, he has access only to coverage available to unin-
sured Jordanians and must pay for any additional care. 
The detention and deportation of Syrian doctors and 
medical personnel has also been observed. Dr. Khalid 
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al-Adi61 was a physician from Syria who came to Irbid, a city 
in northern Jordan, in October 2014. He was working as a 
physiotherapist in Syria but had to escape to Jordan because 
he was wanted by the Syrian authorities. He now worked in 
Irbid, Amman, and Ramtha as an intermediary referring 
physician in a network of 50 doctors, including approxi-
mately 20 Syrian physicians. Dr. al-Adi sent Syrian patients 
who contacted him to Jordanian doctors who were able to 
provide them with the required services. Doctors such as Dr. 
al-Adi were clearly in high demand: over the course of the 
two-hour interview in June 2015, his phone rang non-stop, 
and he received over three thousand WhatsApp messages 
from his patients that day alone.62 
In June 2015, Dr. al-Adi was aware of at least 10 Syrian 
physicians who had been deported from Ramtha hospital 
in early 2015. These physicians were working with wounded 
refugees and were referring to specialists working in Ram-
tha, a city in the northwest of Jordan. Once they disappeared, 
Médecins sans frontières took on the mission in Ramtha. 
Dr. al-Adi was also aware of the imprisonment and depor-
tation of three other Syrian doctors with whom he worked 
regularly who were deported in approximately March 2015 
for working without a work permit. Two additional Syrian 
doctors were then caught for working in a hospital. Accord-
ing to Dr. al-Adi, they were initially detained but had since 
received bail and were fighting their deportations in court.63
Doctors like Dr. al-Adi cannot openly practise medicine 
in Jordan. Some practise under the name and licence of Jor-
danian doctors, with some having to pay up to 300 dinars to 
do so.64 This created an unwelcome environment for Syrian 
physicians in an overburdened medical system. As Dr. al-Adi 
noted, “Unfortunately we are losing our own Syrian doctors. 
Many are leaving to Germany. For example, a rare special-
ist in bone diseases and three other neurosurgeons are gone. 
This is a huge loss for the Syrian situation, as they were a 
huge gain. We need these kinds of specialists … For exam-
ple, a specialist doctor, a cousin of mine, is the only doctor 
in vascular surgery in the north of Jordan. But because of 
the strictness of the Jordanian government, he chose to go 
back to work inside Syria in January 2015.”65 The threat of 
detention and deportation forces many Syrian physicians to 
either abandon their practice completely, or greatly limits 
the scope of their work. 
The detention and deportation of Syrian doctors is a trou-
bling phenomenon. As the once-robust Jordanian health-
care system becomes increasingly taxed to provide services 
to both Syrians and Jordanians, actively engaging Syrian 
medical experts and doctors would alleviate some of the 
strain. For example, there is only one hospital in the Middle 
East dedicated to providing free reconstructive surgery for 
people injured in war.66 The Jordanian health-care system 
is dealing with complex cases as a result of the conflict in 
Syria. Many cases require ongoing medical care, such as 
physiotherapy, rehabilitation, and prosthetics support for 
adult and children amputees. According to Hazm Alma-
zouni, journalist with Ammannet, “Physiotherapy treatment 
is very limited and only a few sessions are offered. NGOs try 
to fill in, but do not have capacity, and others do it at ran-
dom. People need time and care to adjust to their new life 
with lost limbs, and have to get used to wearing prosthetics. 
Some have lesions and allergies and it is very difficult.”67 As 
a number of physicians explained, cases involving trauma 
and complex medical needs as a result of war wounds such 
as burn victims, amputees, and refugees requiring ongo-
ing rehabilitation were not widely present in the Jordanian 
medical system before the Syrian conflict. In addition, cases 
involving psychological trauma and vulnerable survivors 
of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and detention 
inside Syria also require ongoing care and access to treat-
ment and services that is very difficult to obtain in Jordan. 
Detention and Deportation for Communicable Diseases
Another troubling reason why Syrian refugees may be 
detained and deported from Jordan is for having a commu-
nicable disease, such as tuberculosis or HIV/AIDS. According 
to UNAIDS, Jordan is among 59 countries, territories, and 
areas that deny entry or residence to people because of their 
HIV status.68 Jordan is also one of 26 countries that deport 
people who are living with HIV.69 The UNHCR has explicitly 
stated that deportation of a refugee solely on the basis of their 
HIV status would breach the 1951 Convention and customary 
international law.70
A number of interviewees noted that a refugee may be 
refouled back to Syria for having a communicable disease, 
such as HIV/AIDS or tuberculosis. According to a human 
rights lawyer in Amman specializing in combating the 
stigma around LGBTI and HIV/AIDS issues in Jordan, it is 
Jordanian policy to deport anyone who tests HIV+ while 
undergoing registration in Jordan, including an HIV+ Syrian 
refugee.71 However, it is not clear whether any HIV+ Syrians 
have actually been removed from Jordan under this policy. 
Nonetheless, for a researcher with Human Rights Watch, 
there was “no question that people are being deported” back 
to Syria for less serious reasons in 2015.72 This observation 
was echoed by Jordanian and international medical experts 
working in Amman, as well as on the northern border with 
Syria.73 A number of medical experts in Jordan also noted the 
deportations of Syrian patients in the middle of the course of 
treatment for “security reasons.”74 It is unclear what security 
reasons warrant deportation in the middle of medical treat-
ment, but a number of interviewees suspected that being 
diagnosed with a communicable disease would qualify as 
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a ground for deportation. Two cases of HIV+ Iraqi refugees 
were referred to the Jordanian government for access to anti-
retroviral treatment but had since disappeared.75 It is unclear 
whether they were deported by the Jordanian authorities or 
whether they were in detention. There have also been docu-
mented cases of Syrian sex workers being deported on the 
grounds of work permit infractions as well as potential com-
municable diseases. 
The impact of survival strategies and the fear of deportation 
is felt in the NGO community in Jordan. For example, Souriat 
without Borders is a small local NGO focusing on primary 
care and rehabilitation of Syrian war wounded in Amman, 
Jordan.76 Dr. Hafiz, the head doctor, noted that in his practice 
he had come across cases where the Jordanian government 
has deported people back to Syria for a variety of reasons, 
including the deportation of wounded persons who entered 
Jordan seeking treatment. Dr. Hafiz stressed that Jordan was 
dealing with an unprecedented number of refugees, many of 
whom had serious medical issues.77 According to Dr. Hafiz, 
the threat of detention and deportation only exacerbates peo-
ple’s reluctance to seek treatment, especially for stigmatized 
communicable diseases. Communicable diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS are a very publicly sensitive issue that the Jordanian 
government does not openly discuss, especially pertaining 
to the Syrian refugee population. While testing for HIV/AIDS 
does sometimes occur as part of the registration process, it is 
unclear whether these tests are accurate and how the medical 
information is handled, resulting in issues of discrimination 
and breaches of confidentiality. In the experiences of the phy-
sicians interviewed, while large samples of blood may be col-
lected from the Syrian refugee population, there simply is no 
capacity to test everyone. There were also a number of cases 
reported of Syrian refugees being able to register without ever 
providing a blood sample. 
Discrimination of People Living with Communicable 
Diseases
Discrimination against people living with communica-
ble diseases further exacerbates their isolation and lack of 
access to treatment. It also creates a further deterrent to 
seek services for fear of being detained and deported. These 
risks disproportionately affect marginalized groups such as 
members of the LGBTI community, survivors of SGBV, and 
sex workers.78 The ongoing Syrian conflict creates complex 
protection problems with legal, medical, and social dimen-
sions that increase the risk of HIV infection. These risks 
disproportionately affect vulnerable groups, such as LGBTI, 
survivors of SGBV, and sex workers. The choice to highlight 
these groups is not meant to conflate them with higher inci-
dences of communicable diseases. However, there is recogni-
tion that these groups are more vulnerable to transmission 
and do not have access to regular treatment and services as a 
result of their marginalization.79
LGBTI Discrimination 
LGBTI rights are very contentious in Jordan and, as a result, 
LGBTI individuals keep a low profile. Driving the LGBTI com-
munity underground increases risk factors of HIV infection, 
as people are less willing to openly identify if they need test-
ing or treatment. In addition, large portions of the LGBTI 
population in Jordan may not even be aware of the risk of 
infection, since outreach and education on prevention of 
STIs such as HIV are virtually non-existent. 
Survivors of SGBV
There are documented cases of sexual violence inside the 
Zaatari and Azraq camp complexes, as well as within the 
urban refugee population.80 The Zaatari refugee camp com-
plex houses approximately 79,150 refugees81 and the Azraq 
refugee camp houses approximately 26,820 refugees.82 The 
JCLA and other community advocacy groups have been 
documenting cases of sexual abuse and sexual harassment 
in Azraq and Zaatari camp since the start of the Syrian refu-
gee conflict. While there is some SGBV psychosocial support 
provided to women and children by the NGOs and INGOs 
working in the camps, the method of delivery is problematic 
and some women refuse to attend these services. According 
to one worker, “Awareness sessions can be offered on a daily 
bases, but women prefer to walk over two kilometres to get 
bread for their children rather than sit in an awareness work-
shop. Instead, NGOs should go door-to-door when talking 
about sensitive issues.”83 It is also unclear whether there is any 
focus on communicable diseases and the potential detention 
and deportation that can result by openly identifying.
Increase in Forced Sex Work and Forced Marriage84 
In Jordan, domestic labour laws do not allow the majority 
of Syrian refugees to work.85 The Jordanian Constitution 
explicitly states in Article 23 that the right to work is reserved 
for Jordanian citizens.86 However, as discussed above, the 
recent push to issue an increased number of work permits 
for Syrian refugees is meant to alleviate the need for Syrians 
to resort to informal work. However, many Syrian refugees 
simply do not have the means to pay the registration fee 
required for the work permit and medical coverage, espe-
cially for large families, and resort to remain in the informal 
economy.87 The UNHCR estimates that one in six Syrians liv-
ing in Jordan live in extreme poverty and “desperate living 
conditions”88 with incomes below US$3.20 per day. 
The difficulty of working legally in Jordan exacerbates an 
increase in sex work.89 Peace Link Operator, an NGO launched 
in 2015 in Irbid, Jordan, provides psychosocial support and 
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services to vulnerable women and girls who have experienced 
SGBV as a result of the war in Syria, as well as women who 
have entered the sex trade in Jordan. They have worked with 
200 Syrian women and 13 Jordanian women who have been 
engaged in the sex trade. They provide psychosocial support 
and long-term evaluation, access to social workers and psy-
chiatrists, and a number of projects for the women and girls 
to join.90 Rima Tahat, co-founder of Peace Link Operator, 
has noted a steady increase of prostitution in the Zaatari and 
Azraq refugee camps. Women engage in sex work or are sold 
to other men for the night by their own husbands or families 
for as little as 70 JD/US$98.91 Peace Link Operator has docu-
mented 13 such cases from Zaatari camp. Ms Tahat spoke of 
workers in camps, truck drivers, or private security officers 
who pay Zaatari refugee girls and women for sex.92 
Ms Tahat also observed instances of early and forced 
marriage, often motivated by economic pressures: “One 
woman told me, ‘I can’t let her [the daughter] go to school, 
I want to marry her off. It is OK to marry her off at 11. She 
will mature with him.’ They don’t care who will marry her, 
just whoever will pay more.”93 Peace Link Operator, which 
worked in prostitution, has worked with cases where young 
girls were forcibly married off or forced to enter the sex trade 
in Jordan’s urban centres. For example, in April 2015, the NGO 
started working with two girls they found in Mafraq city. In 
addition, in a publicized case, 11 Syrian girls were captured 
by Jordanian police for prostitution in Irbid, and were subse-
quently detained in Azraq camp.94 According to Rima Tahat, 
if a woman is caught engaging in sex work, “The choice is to 
either go back to the camp or face expulsion to Syria. If she 
doesn’t have family in the camp, she will be sent back, unless 
she is able to pay off the officials.”95
In Ms Tahat’s experience, women engaged in sex work 
cannot be approached directly to offer counselling or test-
ing and treatment for communicable diseases. Instead, trust 
must be nurtured through psychosocial services until the 
woman is willing to talk about her traumatic experiences.96 
The women have come to trust staff at Peace Link Operator, 
and according to Ms Tahat, “Sometimes they do not want to 
take the prescribed medicine and are ashamed to talk to Jor-
danian doctors. They prefer to talk to someone they know.”97 
Lack of Focus on Treatment and Prevention Education
While there is recognition among medical professionals and 
humanitarian workers that communicable diseases are on 
the rise, there is reticence to discuss this sensitive issue, even 
in international organization. For example, international 
humanitarian organization staff in Amman acknowledged 
that there continues to be a general lack of awareness in 
Jordan about safe sex practices and how they are linked 
to the transmission of communicable diseases such as HIV. 
However, with increased population mixing, individualized 
sexual violence, and early marriage on the rise, they stated, 
“It is a myth that [HIV] won’t happen here.” For example, four 
IRC medical volunteers interviewed in Irbid, Jordan, in 
June 2015 saw approximately 400 Syrian families a month 
for health monitoring, including cases of communicable dis-
eases. They emphasized that shame and stigma continue to 
affect disclosure of contracted infections. According to one 
IRC nurse volunteer, “We have seen cases where they think 
they have an infection but because they are not well educated 
and ashamed to say that they have this disease, and they do 
not tell.”98 The team also noted a lack of strict confidential-
ity policies and case management between NGOs, especially 
when dealing with sensitive topics such as sexually trans-
mitted diseases.99 This exacerbates people’s unwillingness 
to disclose their communicable disease out of fear of being 
reported to the authorities, detained, and deported. In fact, 
the IRC team noted one case of a family deported en masse to 
Syria when one member was found to have a communicable 
disease, suspected to be HIV.100 However, it was not possible 
to verify this deportation. 
In Peace Link Operator’s work inside the Azraq refugee 
camp, the NGO also noted a gap between the focus of humani-
tarian organizations and the reality in the field. While some 
international organizations focus on issues such as personal 
hygiene and pregnancy prevention in Jordan, they do not 
work on sensitive issues such as HIV prevention and infection. 
According to Ms Tahat, “No one tries to deal with sensitive 
areas like this.”101 The JCLA and IRC teams also noted the inad-
equacy of outreach activities to directly address HIV and other 
communicable diseases, and the reluctance of Syrian refugees 
to attend seminars that could increase their stigma if they were 
openly identified as survivors of SGBV, LGBTI, or living with or 
vulnerable to HIV infection. As a result, Tahat saw the work 
of local organizations with connections to the community as 
being able to gain access to vulnerable populations to offer 
them culturally appropriate services.102 While local efforts can 
begin to address the chronic need for related health services 
and information, dedicated funding and further resources are 
needed to reach as many affected people as possible.
Focus is also needed on education about the risks of 
detention and deportation as a result of disclosing one’s 
status as a person living with communicable diseases such 
as HIV. This includes strengthening access to mechanisms to 
stop deportations from Jordan, as well as local and interna-
tional advocacy to prevent deportations altogether. 
Part 3: Mechanisms to Stop Detention and 
Deportation from Jordan
Early intervention and advocacy is the most successful way 
to prevent deportations back to Syria. Organizations such 
Volume 33 Refuge Number 2
26
as the Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development 
(ARDD) and JCLA, as well as the UNHCR, routinely intervene 
and have stopped a number of deportations. For example, as 
noted by lawyers at one community legal centre, in the last 
week of May 2014, a Syrian husband and wife were caught 
working as sex workers. As noted by a Jordanian lawyer, Syr-
ians in Jordan are desperate for work, and sex work is on 
the rise in order for families to survive. The husband was 
detained in the city of Irbid, and the Jordanian authorities 
planned to deport his wife and their four children. How-
ever, the deportation was stopped by the legal team at the 
centre.103 
Importantly, detention and deportations from Jordan do 
not fall under the purview of Jordanian courts. Instead, the 
governor of the Interior Ministry has the ultimate jurisdic-
tion to detain and deport Jordanians and non-Jordanians. In 
the experience of one Jordanian legal team, the governorate 
exercises its discretion to detain and deport people arbitrar-
ily: “It is all about the governor’s mood that day.”104 This 
makes advocacy efforts for counsel to intervene in Syrian 
detention and deportations very difficult. In the experience 
of this legal team, there is no access to a tribunal or appeal in 
accordance to principles of procedural justice. Instead, the 
decision whether to deport a person or not rests on an infor-
mal conversation with the governor on a case-by-case basis. 
The governor can also impose additional days in detention 
as he sees fit. In a poignant example of the discretionary 
nature of detention, a Jordanian lawyer recalled one case 
of a Syrian female detainee that was declared free to go, but 
at the last minute the governor decided that he would keep 
her in detention for additional days in order to “teach her a 
lesson.”105 
Ultimately, deporting Syrian refugees back to Syria is in 
contravention of the Jordanian MOU with the UNHCR and 
a clear violation of the principle of non-refoulement.106 
While there are no official government reports to corrobo-
rate these deportations, the UNHCR has acknowledged that 
they are aware of deportations of Syrian refugees from 
Jordan,10including documented deportations for work 
permit infractions (including Syrian doctors treating their 
patients),108 and deportation for “security concerns,” includ-
ing families with children.109 Human Rights Watch also 
documented cases of Syrian patients being deported mid-
treatment from hospitals,110 and a number of sex workers 
have also been deported back to Syria. Jordan has been 
internationally criticized for the detention and deportation 
of other groups of refugees, such as its problematic policy 
to deport eight hundred Sudanese refugees in early 2016.111 
There has also been some pushback from donor nations to 
suspend funding to Jordan if these deportations continue. 
However, there been little attention paid to the deportations 
of Syrians back into the zone of active conflict. 
While Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention, it 
is a signatory to the 1984 UN Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment and as such is bound by Article 3 not to return or expel 
any persons to states where they would be in danger of being 
tortured.112 Jordan also ratified the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which clearly stip-
ulates universal rights to physical and mental health.113 The 
right to health is also recognized in numerous Articles of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women,114 and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child,115 as well as Article 25 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights,116 all of which Jordan has ratified. 
Jordan’s deportations of Syrian refugees back into active 
conflict is not only a violation of international law. This 
practice can also exacerbate incidences of undisclosed com-
municable diseases, which can result in increased exposure 
both for the Syrian refugee population as well as the host 
country population. For example, while numbers of HIV are 
low among refugee and host-country populations in Jordan, 
117 the social disruption and instability due to the ongoing 
Syrian conflict creates an environment for increased expo-
sure to HIV and other communicable diseases. For refugees 
who identify as LGBTI, as survivors of SGBV, or as sex workers, 
marginalization, precarious living situations, and unequal 
access to resources in host countries aggravate the risk fac-
tors that can render them vulnerable to HIV infection. 
There is a need to raise awareness of health rights in 
Jordan and with Syrian refugees living there. According to 
Dr. al-Adi, a Syrian doctor working in Irbid, Jordan, “It is 
very necessary to speak up now, while numbers are small. 
If we don’t, there will be huge costs to economy and human 
life. I am positive there will be lots of HIV cases.”118 Raising 
awareness of the right to testing and treatment could help 
to promote prevention and counter discrimination against 
persons living with HIV. However, as journalist Hazm Alma-
zouni, told IHRP, there is no such “culture of rights” among 
people who may be most vulnerable to HIV, and “people 
often do not know they are being discriminated because they 
do not understand their rights.”119 Even if people are aware 
of discrimination, they are afraid to self-identify, as they do 
not want to place themselves at increased risk of detention, 
deportation, and further mistreatment by Jordanian authori-
ties. Deporting Syrian physicians for practising in Jordan is 
a grave misstep, as Jordan struggles to meet the complex 
medical needs of the Syrian refugee population. Instead, 
specifically targeted efforts to introduce Syrian physicians 
into the strained Jordanian medical system and economy 
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would alleviate the lack of doctors and medical personnel 
needed to serve both the Syrian refugees and the Jordanian 
population. 
Any durable solutions and future directions for responses 
to the Syrian conflict must address the impact on host coun-
tries such as Jordan and position draconian and discretion-
ary policies of deporting Syrian refugees back into active 
conflict in the broader social context. Jordanian detention 
policies are an ineffective way to control the numbers of Syr-
ian refugees and instead perpetuate a discretionary system 
that directly contravenes international law. Concerted local 
advocacy to prevent detention and deportations of Syrian 
refugees should be bolstered by an international response 
directly condemning the Jordanian practice that is in contra-
vention of the principle of non-refoulement. However, as the 
ongoing policy to detain and deport Syrian refugees in Jordan 
highlights, it is a result of ongoing social disruption, strained 
economy and health sector, and overall lack of resources for 
the small country of Jordan to deal with millions of Syrian 
refugees who will likely continue to live in Jordan for the 
foreseeable future. The Jordanian government and INGOs are 
obliged to uphold the right to health care and should explic-
itly address the spread of communicable diseases that are 
linked to social processes of survival strategies in a margin-
alized population. One way to uphold the universal right to 
health while meeting its obligations of non-refoulement is to 
advocate for specific work permits for doctors, nurses, and 
other medical professionals, which would both alleviate the 
pressure on the Jordanian health-care system while allowing 
more Syrian refugees access to legal work. 
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